{"id":201,"date":"2025-07-29T23:29:17","date_gmt":"2025-07-29T21:29:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/?p=201"},"modified":"2025-07-30T23:47:23","modified_gmt":"2025-07-30T21:47:23","slug":"beyond-the-battlefield-social-movements-and-civil-resistance-in-wartime-lebanon-1982-1990","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/archives\/201","title":{"rendered":"Beyond the Battlefield: Social Movements and Civil Resistance in Wartime Lebanon (1982\u20131990)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/h2>\n

Understanding social movements in times of war challenges dominant narratives that often reduce conflict to military confrontations and elite negotiations. While armed actors shape the course of war, civil society remains an active agent, engaging in protest and political mobilization despite instability and violence. Civil movements during conflicts provide critical insights into how populations resist, negotiate, and reimagine power structures amid state collapse and foreign intervention. Examining protest activity during the Lebanese Civil War (1982-1990) reveals how social, economic, and political grievances translated into organized mobilization, despite the war\u2019s fragmented and violent landscape. Analyzing patterns of protest provides insight into broader debates on social struggles, contentious politics, civil resistance, and state-society relations in wartime contexts.<\/p>\n

This article presents the findings of a study that employs a quantitative and qualitative analysis of an extensive archive documenting protests during the Lebanese Civil War period from 1982 to 1990. The dataset, compiled from contemporary newspaper reports from Annahar and Assafir, categorizes protests based on their demands, geographic distribution, organizational structure, and tactics of mobilization. The methodology allows for a systematic examination of how protest activity evolved over time and how different actors, from labor unions to sectarian political parties, shaped the protest landscape. By integrating descriptive statistical analysis with historical contextualization, this research addresses a critical gap in the literature, demonstrating how wartime social struggles shed light on both the immediate struggles of affected populations and the broader socio-political transformations that later shaped postwar Lebanon.<\/p>\n

The period from 1982 to 1990 witnessed a series of critical turning points in the trajectory of the Lebanese Civil War. In 1982, Israel launched a large-scale invasion of Lebanon, culminating in the siege of Beirut and the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under international supervision. The assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel later that year intensified sectarian tensions, followed by the Sabra and Shatila massacre and the beginning of the Israeli withdrawal. The invasion catalyzed the emergence of Hezbollah, which quickly became a major actor in resisting Israeli occupation in the South. In 1983, the conflict escalated with the outbreak of the War of the Mountain between the Lebanese Forces and the Progressive Socialist Party, leading to the expulsion of Christian militias from the Chouf region. The year also saw bombings targeting American and French military compounds, leading to the gradual withdrawal of multinational forces. A failed attempt at political normalization culminated in the unpopular May 17 Agreement with Israel, which was later rescinded in 1984 after the February 6 Intifada, a major uprising that expelled government and Western influence from West Beirut and marked Syria\u2019s growing dominance. Between 1985 and 1987, internal strife intensified with the beginning of the War of the Camps between Amal and Palestinian factions, and rising tensions between rival Shi\u2019a movements. In 1988, Lebanon plunged into further political paralysis when President Amine Gemayel appointed General Michel Aoun to lead a transitional military government, triggering a dual-government crisis. Aoun\u2019s “War of Liberation” against Syrian forces in 1989 escalated into full-scale confrontation, further devastating the country. The conflict formally concluded with the signing of the Taif Agreement in October 1989, which restructured the political system and marked the beginning of the end of hostilities. Aoun was ousted in 1990 by a Syrian-led military offensive, effectively ending the civil war. Throughout this period, despite the devastation and fragmentation of state institutions, waves of popular mobilization, including general strikes, protests, marches, and demonstrations, reflected society\u2019s resistance to militarization and its demands for political, economic, and social justice.<\/p>\n

The economic context of this period was marked by extreme volatility, exacerbating existing social inequalities and fueling protest activity. The Israeli invasion of 1982 dealt a severe blow to Lebanon\u2019s financial and industrial sectors, notably by targeting the Palestinian Liberation Organization\u2019s economic assets, which accounted for approximately a third of the country\u2019s GDP1. This, in turn, triggered capital flight and the collapse of over ten banks2, while militias tightened their grip over public resources amidst the disintegration of state institutions. Gulf remittances declined from over 2.2 billion dollars in 1980 to just 300 million in 1987, further deepened the crisis3. With the state weakened, foreign reserves drained, and tax collection nearly paralysed, the country slid into economic freefall. Inflation soared from 60% in 1985 to 425% by 1987, while the Lebanese lira plummeted from 4.53 pounds per dollar in 1984 to 1,838 pounds per dollar by 19924. Unemployment surged to 35%, wages lost over 80% of their value, and the cost of basic goods rose by more than 200% amid widespread speculation and militia-controlled black markets5. A parallel economy flourished through illicit ports \u2013 the arms and drug trades in particular \u2013 and customs revenues fell from 97% to 10% of state income by 19866. In the absence of a functional central government, state services and living conditions deteriorated rapidly. The crisis reached a political climax in 1985, as the government effectively ceased functioning for nearly two years due to sectarian deadlock. Amid this chaos, unions, women\u2019s groups, and opposition parties organised mass mobilisation campaigns, particularly through the \u201cNational Committee Against High Prices and Monopolies\u201d, to protest collapsing living standards, demand wage correction, and oppose the lifting of subsidies. These movements briefly reasserted popular demands in the public sphere but were ultimately marginalised by entrenched militia rule.<\/p>\n

Despite the war, and arguably because of it, various civil groups remained active in organizing protests around workers’ rights, social services, and human rights issues. Teachers and university professors mobilized frequently around a broad range of demands, including reduced teaching hours, the establishment of support institutions such as the Teacher\u2019s House and Fund, protection from arbitrary dismissals, improvements to state employee cooperatives, transportation allowances, parity between the public and private education sectors, the safeguarding of union freedoms, and the restoration of national unity and state institutions7.<\/p>\n

The General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCLW) played an intermittent but increasingly pivotal role in labor organizing during the civil war. Following a period of inactivity between 1975 and 1977, during which the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees (FTUWE) assumed leadership, the GCLW remained largely passive throughout the early 1980s. From 1980 to 1985, it issued occasional statements on inflation and living conditions but failed to translate these into effective mobilization, hampered by internal divisions, sectarian influence, and militia interference. A notable shift occurred in 1986, when the GCLW began coordinating with other unions and civil society actors, culminating in its peak mobilization in 1987 with two national syndical conferences and the massive November 5 general strike. These demonstrations united East and West Beirut under demands for wage corrections, labor protections, and an end to the war. Nevertheless, the GCLW\u2019s broader impact was limited by its confederal structure and the need for consensus across diverse federations in political and sectarian terms8. Between 1975 and 1992, the GCLW issued 23 threats of strikes or demonstrations, however, only a minority were acted upon due to last-minute salary concessions, security threats, or internal fragmentation9.<\/p>\n

Women were also critical actors in civil society, occupying key roles in social movements that sought to contest militarization, sectarian fragmentation, and structural inequalities. Their mobilization extended beyond traditional caregiving roles to encompass forms of collective action, including community organizing, grassroots service provision, and political advocacy. Women\u2019s participation articulated demands for socio-economic justice, labor rights, and demilitarization.\u00a0In 1987, the Women’s National Union organized a protest against what they called the “war of hunger” being waged by the warlords and militias against the people. Protesters carried slogans such as “The achievements of the civil unity government: heaven for the leaders and hell for the people.” Women’s organizations also assumed leadership roles in broader movements of contestation, including the general strike in November 1987 that culminated in a large protest at the National Museum. These interventions challenged dominant gender norms and positioned women as agents of resistance and social transformation.<\/p>\n

The families of the forcibly disappeared and detained launched persistent campaigns, demanding accountability for thousands of Lebanese kidnapped or held in Syrian or Israeli prisons, and by Lebanese militias. Additionally, activists for the rights of people with disabilities, many of whom were war victims, protested for an end to the civil war and for greater state support for them. In October 1987, the disability movement, alongside other civil society organizations, organized the \u201cNonviolent March of the Disabled for Peace and Human Rights in Lebanon,\u201d spanning 195 km from Halba to Tyre, passing through the then-divided East and West Beirut, to call for the end of the civil war. Growing anti-war mobilizations in the mid to late 1980s illustrate how Lebanese civil society actively engaged in collective action to contest violence, socio-economic, and political injustices even under extreme wartime conditions. Despite their scale and persistence, many of these movements have been systematically marginalized in the historical discourse, as hegemonic narratives prioritize accounts of armed conflict and elite decision-making, erasing the contributions of grassroots mobilization from collective memory.<\/p>\n

By examining the patterns of protest during this critical period, this study highlights the agency of Lebanese civil society in shaping wartime politics. It underscores how economic crises, foreign occupations, and internal political struggles fueled diverse forms of mobilization, laying the groundwork for postwar political contestations. Through this analysis, the research contributes to broader discussions on the intersection of war and protest, demonstrating how social struggles persist even in the most violent and fragmented environments.<\/p>\n

What were these protests mainly about?<\/h2>\n

1. Timeline and Trends<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Between 1981 and 1990, protest activity in Lebanon reflected the shifting dynamics of the civil war, regional interventions, and socio-economic deterioration. The demands raised by demonstrators varied across the decade, with certain categories dominating during key political and military turning points. Five main demand types stand out: regional political protests (primarily against the Israeli occupation and in support of Palestine), labor-related mobilizations, national political protests (mainly commemorating political assassinations), social demands, anti-war and security-related protests, protests against arrests and disappearances, and economic grievances.<\/p>\n

The early 1980s were marked by the peak of protests against the Israeli occupation, particularly between 1982 and 1984. These regional political demands were by far the most prominent in the decade, culminating in 1984, which registered the highest concentration of anti-Israel protests (6.15%). This period also saw demonstrations denouncing Israeli detentions and military abuses. Simultaneously, labor mobilizations were on the rise. In 1982, the pressed wood workers launched a protest that lasted over 150 days before being interrupted by the Israeli invasion. Between 1982 and 1984, labor demands increasingly focused on wages, job security, seniority-based promotions, and some resistance to the hiring of migrant workers. This period also marked the collective bargaining of business owners, such as those operating private water distribution and agricultural land, amid the deepening economic crisis.<\/p>\n

From 1985 to 1988, protests were increasingly shaped by Lebanon\u2019s collapsing economy and the intensification of the war. Labor activism remained prominent, though its nature shifted. The FTUWE-led economic protests in 1985 focused on wage erosion, inflation, and contractual rights. From 1986 to 1987, leadership passed to the GCLW, which organized multiple general strikes. However, the momentum of labor protests declined in 1988, in part due to deteriorating security and political fragmentation.<\/p>\n

Security-related protests gained visibility during this period, reflecting rising popular anger toward militia violence and war-related criminality. These demonstrations typically denounced civilian killings, abductions, and broader anti-war demands.<\/p>\n

Social demands, such as those concerning infrastructure, education, and health, were prominent in 1983 and again in 1988, the latter marked by calls for better welfare, such as access to the National Social Security Fund. Displacement caused by the War of Sidon and the War of the Mountain triggered significant protests with social demands around 1983, especially among displaced Christian communities. Human rights protests also evolved during these years: after 1984, the focus shifted from Israeli detention to the fate of the disappeared during the war.<\/p>\n

The late 1980s were defined by an escalation in political contestation. 1989 marked a peak in national political protests, largely linked to support for Michel Aoun\u2019s political stance, the assassination of key political figures, and tensions surrounding the Taef Accord. Although national politics had remained a secondary theme for most of the decade, it surged during this transitional moment.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, regional political demands regained momentum in 1988 and 1989, driven by a resurgence in anti-Israel sentiment linked to the First Intifada, and the emergence of Hezbollah-led protests that were anti-U.S. and pro-Iranian.<\/p>\n

2. Regional and International Politics<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Between 1982 and 1990, regional and international political protests in Lebanon were overwhelmingly shaped by opposition to the Israeli occupation and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, which together accounted for over 86% of the protests in this category. Anti-Israel protests dominated the early years, peaking in 1984 with 23.77% of all regional\/international protest activity. In 1982, 4.91% of such protests targeted Israel, followed by a sharp increase in 1983 (13.63%) and then the peak in 1984. These protests were not confined to the occupied South. In April 1983, far to the north, the residents of Akkar closed their businesses and schools, and 5,000 people gathered in Halba, carrying banners that declared, “The only response to Israeli occupation is the escalation of the armed struggle” and “Greetings to our people in Jabal Amel, the Mount of Fire [Nablus], and the Golan plateau for their resistance against the Zionist enemy.” A month later, in May 1983, the spirit of defiance spread: Beirut, its southern suburbs, and the Bekaa Valley joined a general strike in solidarity with the rising wave of resistance in South Lebanon. Across southern towns and villages, life ground to a halt as civilians erected roadblocks and confronted Israeli occupying forces with sticks, stones, and their bare hands.<\/p>\n

Protests supporting the Palestinian cause also formed a significant share, representing 22.19% of regional political protests over the decade. In 1982, to commemorate Palestinian Land Day, around 100,000 people took to the streets of Beirut, marching in two massive processions that converged at the UNESCO Palace and the Palestinian Armed Struggle Headquarters in Burj el-Barajneh. The atmosphere was celebratory, with music and dancing filling the air as the crowds honored Palestinian resistance. Expressions of solidarity with Palestine surged again in the late 1980s, particularly in 1988 and 1989. In May 1990, a general strike swept across Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, and South Lebanon in solidarity with the First Intifada and in protest against Israeli massacres of Palestinians and the ongoing occupation of Lebanon. Large demonstrations erupted throughout the country, with the notable exception of East Beirut and Keserwan, where mobilization was absent. Protesters carried banners that read, “Revolution, revolution against the occupier,” voicing a unified call for resistance.<\/p>\n

By the late 1980s, regional protest themes began to diversify. Anti-U.S. protests appeared in 1986 and remained present in 1989. Pro-Iranian mobilization emerged notably in 1989, reflecting the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics. Other less frequent protest narratives included opposition to Iran, France, and Syria.<\/p>\n

3. Labor<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Labor-related protests represented one of the most sustained and diverse areas of mobilization during the Lebanese Civil War, accounting for a wide range of demands including wage increases, contract rights, job security, union activity, and working conditions. According to the data, wage-related protests alone made up 29.64% of all labor demands, followed by protests concerning contracts (24.81%), job security and promotions (12.97%), and union-related actions, both in support of (8.90%) and opposition to (0.09%) unions. Other significant demands addressed working conditions (2.94%), dismissals (2.84%), and anti-migrant worker sentiment (0.19%).<\/p>\n

Protests around contracts and employment terms escalated steadily throughout the decade, peaking in 1987 (6.72%), a year marked by heightened labor unrest and intensified economic crisis. Workers\u2019 demands for formal contracts and the regularization of their employment were especially prominent. By contrast, wage demands reached their highest point in 1988 (6.82%) after rising consistently from 1982 onward. However, wage adjustments to inflation were achieved through ad-hoc governmental reactions rather than through concessions to civil movements or negotiations, most notably in 1987, when the government implemented three adjustments in a single year. These adjustments were granted not out of concern for the labor movement, but with the prior knowledge that inflation would inevitably erode the value of the increased wages10.<\/p>\n

The demand for job security and promotions, which made up 12.97% of labor protests overall, was strongest between 1983 and 1985. This period reflected heightened mobilization among public sector employees who demanded the adjustment of their ranks and salaries. Protests against the hiring of migrant workers were limited (0.19%) and framed around threats to job opportunities for Lebanese nationals. In 1984, for example, the GCLW demanded that the Salim el Hoss government cease issuing permits for migrant workers and establish a committee that would examine the employment of migrant workers in Lebanon. The labor movement also targeted firings, which accounted for 2.84% of protests, and working conditions (2.94%), with notable spikes in 1986 and 1988.<\/p>\n

Union-related protest activity made up 11.17% of labor-related protests. Supportive protests peaked in 1982, mostly in support of the Ghandour pressed wood factory workers, and again in 1983 (2.56%), 1985 (1.23%), and 1987 (2.08%), indicating periodic worker alignment with established labor institutions. A small share of protests (4.73%) included demands for pension reform, sector-specific regulations, and broader socio-economic grievances.<\/p>\n

4. National Politics<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Between 1982 and 1990, protest activity tied to national political issues in Lebanon displayed distinct peaks linked to commemorating political assassinations and contesting leadership. The data show that the most prominent category within national political protests was support for specific political parties, movements, or militias, accounting for 27.30% of all protests in this domain. These were largely concentrated around commemorations of assassinated leaders, with notable spikes in 1984, 1987, and 1989. These events reflected how political mourning served as a form of mobilization and identity affirmation, especially among partisan communities. Figures such as Kamal Jumblatt, Rashid Karami, Ren\u00e9 Moawad, and Mahdi Amel were memorialized in demonstrations that commemorated their assassinations and rallied supporters around their respective parties.<\/p>\n

Direct opposition to political assassinations also constituted a major share, with 23.04% of national political protests falling into this category. In November 1984, after the Israeli assassination of Sayyid Abdel Latif al-Amin, a Shi\u2019a cleric active in South Lebanon\u2019s resistance, a general strike erupted across the South. The protest was met with harsh repression: Israeli forces surrounded villages, blocked Red Cross access, and carried out arbitrary arrests. In 1990, another general strike took place in East Beirut, the Metn, and Zgharta after the assassination of Dany Chamoun and his family. His funeral procession in Deir el-Qamar became a massive demonstration, drawing together politicians, religious authorities, and labor unions in an expression of national outrage. These events demonstrated that assassinations were not only moments of mourning but also of political mobilization.<\/p>\n

The late 1980s witnessed growing polarization over state legitimacy and foreign tutelage. Support for General Michel Aoun emerged as a significant force, making up 14.65% of all national political protests. In 1989 and 1990, demonstrators gathered around the Baabda presidential palace, while others marched to Bkerki, the seat of the Maronite Patriarch. These rallies were split between supporters of Aoun and those backing the Patriarch\u2019s critique of him, reflecting deep fractures within the Christian community. The Taef Accord, signed in 1989 to end the war, became another flashpoint: protests against it accounted for 2.80% of national protests, with demonstrators expressing fears that the agreement would deepen Syrian domination over Lebanon\u2019s postwar political system.<\/p>\n

Anti-Syrian protests (2.40%), anti-Hezbollah actions (1.33%), and smaller demonstrations against the PLO, the President of the Republic, or in favor of the Lebanese Armed Forces (1.07%) further underscore the fragmented nature of national political allegiances. Notably, protests against Hezbollah occurred in the context of its violent confrontations with the Amal Movement, testifying to the intense intra-sectarian rivalries within Lebanon.<\/p>\n

In sum, national political protests during the Lebanese Civil War were episodic but emotionally charged, tied closely to acts of violence, leadership crises, and major turning points in the political process. Peaks in 1984, 1987, and especially 1989, when support for Aoun and opposition to Taef reached their height, reveal how protest was shaped less by consistent ideological programs than by moments of crisis that mobilized constituencies around identity, loyalty, and contested visions of the state.<\/p>\n

5. Social Demands<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Social-related protest demands in Lebanon between 1981 and 1990 reflected both long-standing structural deficiencies and war-induced disruptions to basic services. The most sustained theme across the decade was education, which constituted 38.08% of all social protest demands. Education protests were present throughout the period, with particularly high peaks in 1984 (8.40%), 1987 (8.10%), and 1988 (5.70%), as teachers, students, and parents demanded adequate salaries, better infrastructure, and protection of the public education system. One of the most notable episodes occurred in May 1987, when a nationwide teachers\u2019 strike shut down schools across Beirut, the North, the Bekaa, and parts of the South, with educators calling for urgent salary adjustments, integration of contract teachers, and reforms to reverse the collapse of public education; demands that continue to echo into the present.<\/p>\n

In the early 1980s, particularly in 1982 (6.45%) and 1984 (6.30%), a high number of social protests \u2013 mostly in the form of petitions \u2013 focused on infrastructure, as communities demanded access to roads, electricity, water, and essential public services. These protests declined after the mid-1980s, as addressing the social consequences of the economic crisis took priority.<\/p>\n

A shift becomes visible after 1988, when demands for social welfare programs rose significantly, comprising 16.19% of all social-related protests overall. The most prominent year was 1988 (7.05%), a moment of deep economic crisis. These protests often targeted the deterioration or inaccessibility of state welfare schemes such as the National Social Security Fund and called for broader access to healthcare, pensions, and unemployment protections.<\/p>\n

Other protest themes included calls for improvements in healthcare (2.85%), housing (3.45%), and electricity (4.20%), as well as demonstrations related to war displacement, which accounted for 6.30% of social protests, peaking in 1983 (3.30%) and 1988 (1.50%), reflecting waves of internal displacement following the War of the Mountain, the War of Sidon, and later phases of the civil war that pitted Michel Aoun against Samir Geagea then the Syrian Army.<\/p>\n

6. Security Demands<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Security-related protests during the Lebanese Civil War were primarily driven by widespread opposition to violence, insecurity, and the war’s devastating effects on daily life. The largest category of security-related protest was anti-war or anti-conflict mobilization, which made up 42.08% of all protests in this domain. These peaked in 1985 (8.16%), 1986 (10.72%), and again in 1987 (7.36%), reflecting growing public exhaustion with the war\u2019s destruction and a desire for a political resolution. The General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCWL) played a central role, notably on July 3, 1986, when it organized a general strike \u201cagainst war and hunger\u201d, which garnered broad cross-sectarian and cross-regional participation, highlighting the link between militarization and economic collapse.<\/p>\n

The Lebanese Women’s Association also staged protests during this period, combining anti-war and anti-occupation messages with calls for national unity to end sectarian violence and liberate occupied territories. These actions underscored the ways in which security demands often intersected with broader political and social concerns, especially from actors outside traditional party structures.<\/p>\n

Demands for improved personal and public security and against crime made up 22.24% and 21.76% of protests, respectively. Demands for security peaked in 1985 as the social impact of the economic crisis worsened and civil movements rallied around demands for peace and security to improve socio-economic conditions. These protests were often triggered by crime and lawlessness manifested in kidnappings and attacks against civilians and professionals, such as armed attacks against doctors, bankers, school teachers, university professors, and employees of Electricit\u00e9 du Liban and Banque du Liban, etc.<\/p>\n

7. Human Rights<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Between 1982 and 1990, human rights protests in Lebanon overwhelmingly focused on two deeply intertwined issues: the disappearance of individuals during the war and arbitrary arrests and detentions, together accounting for more than 94% of all protest demands in this category. During the 1980s, Lebanese militias started eliminating intra-sectarian competition and possibly turned to ransom payments for financing, amid declining foreign support prior to the 1982 Israeli invasion.11<\/p>\n

Protests over war-related disappearances dominated the period, making up 65.52% of all human rights protests. These demands peaked between 1984 (17.04%) and 1986 (18.05%), following the 1982 Israeli invasion and the repressive tactics they employed to subdue the local population. These protests were mostly organized by the family members of the disappeared. One particularly tragic episode took place in December 1984, when Nayfeh Najjar Hamadeh, a member of the Committee of the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon, took her own life after losing hope of being reunited with her son. In response, protesters carried her photo alongside her son\u2019s, with placards reading: \u201cThey killed her… and they kidnapped him,\u201d a slogan that encapsulated the grief and desperation of thousands of families across Lebanon. These protests, many led by women, became a key form of public resistance against the normalization of enforced disappearances during the war.<\/p>\n

Protests against arbitrary arrests and detentions made up another 29.21% of the total. These were especially concentrated in 1983 (10.55%) and 1984 (13.79%), and largely targeted Israeli military practices in the occupied south Lebanon. The mothers and wives of detainees held in Ansar prison and other facilities organized a protest in Tyre in December 1984, joined by school strikes demanding the release of prisoners and an end to Israeli occupation. Around the same time, additional protests emerged in support of Suha Beshara, a Lebanese militant detained by Israel, with demonstrators opposing her trial before a military court and urging UN intervention on her behalf.<\/p>\n

While other protest demands, such as those related to freedom of speech, prison conditions, or police violence, appeared occasionally, they remained marginal compared to the dominant focus on detainees and the disappeared. These mobilizations reveal how human rights protests in this period were not framed in abstract legal terms but rather emerged from the concrete and often personal suffering inflicted by war, occupation, and political repression. They gave voice to a silent trauma that cut across sectarian and ideological lines and became one of the most emotionally charged forms of civil resistance during the Lebanese Civil War.<\/p>\n

8. Economic Demands<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Economic protests in Lebanon during the 1980s reflected the escalating toll of war, hyperinflation, currency collapse, and widespread impoverishment. The data show that the most prominent grievance by far was the cost of living, which accounted for 46.82% of all economic protests. This demand surged dramatically between 1985 and 1987, mirroring the sharp deterioration in purchasing power caused by runaway inflation and the collapse of the Lebanese pound. These protests were often led by trade unions, committees, and coalitions that demanded wage increases and price controls to counter the rising cost of basic goods.<\/p>\n

Closely linked to this were protests against the deterioration of the economy itself, which made up 20.60% of the category. These emerged steadily across the decade, with key spikes in 1985 (6.74%), 1987 (7.49%), and again in 1990 (2.62%), when the consequences of Lebanon\u2019s economic collapse worsened dramatically. Demonstrators denounced the lack of public services, the devaluation of wages, and the destruction of infrastructure, attributing these conditions to wartime destruction.<\/p>\n

Demands for the preservation or expansion of subsidies represented another major component, accounting for 19.85% of protests. These calls were especially visible in 1985 (12.73%) and 1987 (2.25%), when the state reduced subsidies on food staples and fuel, sparking widespread backlash.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, protests against government economic policies (5.99%) and against banks and the Association of Banks (1.50%) signaled growing popular frustration with the complicity of Lebanon\u2019s financial elites in the crisis. In 1985 and 1986, demonstrators criticized the failure to regulate financial markets, which had become increasingly speculative. Anti-bank protests, while less frequent, emerged most notably in 1987 (24.34%), coinciding with the most intense inflationary wave of the decade.<\/p>\n

Although limited in frequency, anti-dollarization protests (4.12%) appeared in 1988, as dollar-based transactions began replacing the lira in many sectors, excluding poorer Lebanese from access to essential goods and services. These protests marked the early signs of Lebanon\u2019s transition into a dual-currency economy\u2014a trend that would later become entrenched. Other minor demands included denunciations of tax reforms (0.37%) and calls for structural economic reform, though these were largely overshadowed by more urgent grievances about basic survival.<\/p>\n

Overall, economic protests peaked in 1985 (29.59%) and 1987 (34.08%), underscoring the intensity of the financial crisis during those years. The movement was less ideologically coherent than reactive, shaped by immediate material pressures and the collapse of state capacity. Protesters called for concrete relief: wages, subsidies, food, and shelter, rather than systemic economic transformation. These mobilizations, often tied to broader labor struggles, reflected a society under siege from both war and economic freefall, with the streets becoming a venue for demanding urgent redress.<\/p>\n

Where were these protests taking place?<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The data shows that Beirut was the epicenter of protest activity during the Lebanese Civil War, accounting for 23.1% of all mobilizations (1,197 protests). The South governorate (16.8%) and Mount Lebanon (16.7%) followed closely, reflecting their strategic and political significance. The North (13%), Beqaa (6.9%), and Nabatieh (5.8%) also saw notable protest activity, while Baalbeck-Hermel (4.1%) and Akkar (2%) recorded the lowest levels of mobilization, with Akkar being the least active region. These frequencies should be interpreted with caution, as media outlets often prioritised coverage of protests in the capital, and Lebanon\u2019s population was already highly urbanised by the 1980s. Moreover, the deterioration of communication infrastructure and the fragmentation of Lebanese territory rendered certain areas inaccessible, leading to underreporting from those regions.<\/p>\n

At the local level, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and Baabda witnessed the highest protest activity outside Beirut, while smaller towns like Batroun, Bcharre, and Hermel saw significantly fewer mobilizations. Protests were concentrated in major cities and conflict zones, where political tensions and socio-economic grievances were most pronounced. This distribution highlights how both population density and wartime dynamics shaped protest movements across Lebanon.<\/p>\n

Who were the organizers of these protests?<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Civil society organizations, independent groups, families, and individuals emerged as major organizers of protest during this period, leading 32.9% of mobilizations and championing causes such as human rights, social services, and civic freedoms. These included associations like the Ain El-Mreisseh Youth Association, the Wadi Khaled Youth Association, the Popular, Social, and Women\u2019s Committees in Beirut, and the World Youth Movement for Peace. However, the most frequent mobilizers among these actors were the residents of towns and neighborhoods across Lebanon who repeatedly took to the streets to voice local demands and grievances.<\/p>\n

More than 27.8% of protests during the 1980s were led by unions, syndicates, and workers\u2019 federations, making them the second most active organizers of mobilization. Labor protests were particularly prominent in the mid-to-late 1980s, as economic conditions worsened and workers demanded better wages and protections. One of the most notable examples of labor mobilization came in January 1982, when workers at the Al-Ghandour pressed wood factory launched a strike to oppose its closure. Around 600 workers, backed by Al-Ghandour\u2019s unions, stood their ground, and soon their struggle drew the solidarity of other unions, including the Federation of Trade Unions in the North and the Carpenters Syndicate, who in turn mobilized workers from the steel, sugar, and oil sectors.<\/p>\n

Prior to 1986, the GCLW remained largely passive, while the FTUWE played a key role as the main mobilizing force within the Lebanese labor movement. Between 1986 and 1988, however, the GCLW reemerged as a coordinator between various unions and organizations, working closely with the FTUWE. In a major turning point, during the first week of November 1987, Lebanon witnessed one of the largest protests of the civil war era. A nationwide general strike culminated in two marches \u2013 one from East Beirut and one from West Beirut \u2013 converging at the National Museum, where protesters tore down the barricades that had long divided the capital. They carried slogans denouncing the war, the rule of militias, and the policies of starvation that had devastated the population. This high point of the civil movement was organized by a broad coalition that included the GCLW, the FTUWE, teachers\u2019 and university professors\u2019 unions, and other civil society organizations. Yet by 1989, with the rekindling of violence leading up to the Taif Agreement, the GCLW\u2019s dynamism quickly faded.<\/p>\n

Student groups also carved out a significant role, accounting for 9% of all protests, with university campuses becoming vibrant centers of political activism. In 1989, for example, students at Beirut University College (known today as the Lebanese American University) organized general assemblies and launched strikes across both the Beirut and Byblos campuses, rallying against a 25% hike in tuition fees.<\/p>\n

Palestinian factions and organizations accounted for 4.32% of protests, with their mobilization peaking between 1988 and 1990 in tandem with the First Intifada. In 1989, Palestinian groups in Lebanon organized festivities and military parades across refugee camps to commemorate 24 years of the Palestinian uprising and two years since the start of the Intifada.<\/p>\n

Women\u2019s and feminist contributed to 2.95% of mobilizations, focusing on anti-war demands and broader socioeconomic issues, such as the establishment of the anti-inflation committee. They played an active role in decision-making and mobilizing efforts around labor protests across Lebanon and were instrumental in organizing the National General Syndical Conference, which would eventually lead to the 1987 general strike and protest at the National Museum12.<\/p>\n

Sectarian political parties (9.94%), religious groups (3.65%), and secular political parties (0.17%) also led mobilizations, often aligned with broader political struggles and the commemoration of assassinated political figures. Sectarian parties numerically surpassed and consistently outmatched secular parties (namely the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party) in their ability to mobilize people and resources. Although both sectarian and secular parties operated within and competed over the GCLW, the organizational strength and efficiency of sectarian parties made their mobilizations more significant13.<\/p>\n

While governmental bodies, business owners, and militias occasionally organized protests, their role remained marginal. Overall, the data reveal that labor unions, civil society organizations and individuals, student groups, and sectarian political parties were the primary drivers of civil protest. Although the role of sectarian parties appears smaller compared to these other actors, this is because they largely positioned themselves as status quo forces, aiming to prolong the civil war rather than end it, and therefore in opposition to the civil movements that frequently carried anti-war demands. Their antagonism to the civil movement was not always manifested in blatant oppression but sometimes through cooptation, threats, and sabotage.14 In the post-war era, labor unions retained their role as mobilizers of protests, however, they would soon be broken by sectarian political parties and rendered impotent in Lebanon\u2019s new political order.15<\/p>\n

How did people mainly mobilize?<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The data shows that the most used protest tactic during the Lebanese Civil War was strikes (42.5%), followed by marches or demonstrations (21.3%), petitions (16.3) and sit-ins (15.7%), while roadblocks and blockades (3%) were used in high-tension periods. Strikes were particularly dominant among labor movements, especially in the mid-to-late 1980s, as workers sought to pressure employers and authorities over economic conditions. However, the wartime protest landscape also saw confrontational tactics such as mass attacks, occupations, and boycotts, though these were less frequent.<\/p>\n

Protest as Political Practice During the Civil War<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The analysis of protest activity during the Lebanese Civil War (1982-1990) reveals that, despite the ongoing armed conflict, state and geographic fragmentation, civil society remained highly mobilized. Protest movements largely revolved around anti-Israel and socio-economic grievances, with labor unions and workers\u2019 federations (33.12%), civil society organizations (28.09% of all strike actions), and sectarian political parties (13.34%) leading mass mobilizations against the war, the Israeli invasion, inflation, wage deterioration, and economic instability, particularly in the mid-to-late 1980s as hyperinflation peaked.<\/p>\n

Strike action was most frequently undertaken in response to labor demands (22.64%), national and regional political issues (19.65% and 23.23%, respectively), and security-related grievances (14.20%). Social demands, especially for education and infrastructure, were closely tied to periods of heightened violence and destruction, notably following the Israeli invasion of 1982 and renewed escalations in 1988. The wholesale destruction of infrastructure and the fragmentation of an already fragile state apparatus brought access to public services to the forefront of popular contestation. The deterioration of living standards, coupled with the malaise caused by a protracted war and an increasingly elusive sense of imminent victory, gave rise to anti-war and security-related protests. These protests intensified as instability mounted following the collapse of state institutions, with notable peaks in 1985\u20131986, when living conditions worsened significantly due to an economic crisis that had been brewing since 1982.<\/p>\n

With its invasion and occupation of Lebanon, Israeli forces resorted to massive kidnappings and arbitrary detention to crush Lebanese and Palestinian resistance and consolidate their hold over south Lebanon that would last for 18 years. Lebanese militias also resorted to kidnappings as a means to both eliminate intra-sectarian competition and possibly as a means of financing when foreign actors grew weary of financing a civil war in perpetual stalemate. Syrian forces, while to a lesser extent than their Israeli counterparts, also used abductions and enforced disappearances to strengthen their grip on Lebanese territory. These forceful disappearances spurred the mobilization of families, individuals, and Palestinian organizations, demanding an end to the Israeli occupation and the release of detainees.<\/p>\n

Activism in support of the Palestinian cause was also a central theme of organizing, due to both the presence of a Palestinian population in Lebanon and Lebanese support for the Palestinian plight and Intifada, especially when these two groups coalesced around their rejection of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Protests that took on more local concerns were mostly centered around the commemoration of key milestones in the history of political parties and the assassinations of their leaders.<\/p>\n

Despite the high frequency of civil movements throughout the 1980s, some of which reached a national scale, particularly in 1987, dominant historical narratives have marginalized their role in recounting the Lebanese Civil War, instead reinforcing a focus on military confrontations and elite-level negotiations.. This study demonstrates that wartime protests were not merely reactive but played a crucial role in shaping Lebanon\u2019s socio-political landscape. It also contradicts the simplistic and stereotypical narratives that reduce the Lebanese Civil War to sectarian violence and foreign involvement, as it demonstrates a continuous social militancy in the 1980s that frequently overcame the geographic and sectarian divides of Lebanese society. While this period should not be romanticized as the golden age of secular labour power, given the pervasive influence of sectarianism, it must be understood in its complexity, as participants in these civil protests often mobilized around shared professional, class-based, and national concerns.<\/p>\n

Understanding 1982\u20131990 as a Foundational Moment of Contemporary Lebanon<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The 1980s marked a foundational moment for the post-war Lebanese system, during which deep vertical and horizontal societal transformations took place, shaping contemporary Lebanese society to this day. Vertically, the fragmentation of institutions and the disintegration of state services were cemented by the Israeli invasion of 1982. In the aftermath, a new power structure emerged, centered around militia leaders who seized territory and consolidated control over populations and resources. By capturing state institutions and infrastructure, they positioned themselves as substitutes for state-provided services.16<\/p>\n

These vertical shifts have triggered far-reaching horizontal changes. The decade was marked by extreme social mobility: the bourgeoisie of the ancien r\u00e9gime was displaced by lower-class actors who rallied around militia leaders.17 The economic crisis of the period accelerated this class reshuffling, as currency speculators and monopolists of essential goods profited immensely, often through exploitative and predatory means.18<\/p>\n

During the 1980s, militias largely abandoned broader territorial ambitions, instead settling into a status quo of perpetual, profitable conflict. Their focus shifted to consolidating control over their own territories, which, while already somewhat homogenized by the sectarian displacements of the 1970s, still saw internal competition. Intra-sectarian clashes, summary executions, and persecution became widespread. These episodes were later euphemistically dubbed the \u201cwar of brothers\u201d, a narrative intended to obscure or neutralize the more controversial actions committed by militia leaders against members of their own sects, over whom they would later make protection claims in the post-war era.<\/p>\n

These deep vertical and horizontal transformations were imposed on a society already exhausted by a protracted civil war, material devastation, mass migration, and a pervasive sense of despair, especially as hopes for a decisive victory faded and regional interference grew increasingly blatant and destructive. Within this context, the many forms of mobilization that emerged (ubiquitous though varying in intensity) can be understood as the final attempts of the pre-war social order to resist these changes, even if it lacked the will or capacity to offer a coherent alternative. These efforts ultimately culminated in failure with the institutionalization of these transformations through the Taif Accords. The new political-economic elite that emerged from this period, in alliance with the Syrian mandate forces, did not forget this wave of social resistance. Determined to extinguish it once and for all, they orchestrated a new economic shock in 1992, cracked down on unions, neutralized the GCLW, and waged open class warfare on labor during the post-war reconstruction19.<\/p>\n

It is no coincidence that the period from 1982 to 1990 remains understudied and underexplored from a social perspective. The people\u2019s history of that era reveals a sustained and violent imposition by a political elite that consolidated power during those years and continues to dominate Lebanon today. The economic interests forged during that time, along with the mythology of the contemporary Lebanese system, embodied in the common refrain \u201cit has always been this way\u201d, have vested material and political interests in burying that era in ambiguity.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1 Interview with Mohammad Zbeeb.<\/p>\n

2 Ibid.<\/p>\n

3 \u0646\u0635\u0631\u060c \u0633\u0644\u064a\u0645. \u0633\u0648\u0633\u064a\u0648\u0644\u0648\u062c\u064a\u0627 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0631\u0628 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646: \u0623\u0637\u0631\u0627\u0641 \u0627\u0644\u0635\u0631\u0627\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0627\u0642\u062a\u0635\u0627\u062f\u064a 1970\u2013.1990. \u0628\u064a\u0631\u0648\u062a: \u062f\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0647\u0627\u0631\u060c 2013<\/p>\n

4 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0631\u062c\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0630\u0643\u0648\u0631 \u0623\u0639\u0644\u0627\u0647<\/p>\n

5 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0627\u062c\u060c \u0639\u062f\u0646\u0627\u0646. \u0639\u0627\u0645 \u0627\u0644\u0627\u0646\u0647\u064a\u0627\u0631. \u062c\u0631\u064a\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0641\u064a\u0631\u060c 27 \u0643\u0627\u0646\u0648\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0648\u0644 1985.<\/p>\n

6 \u0646\u0635\u0631\u060c \u0633\u0644\u064a\u0645<\/p>\n

7 \u0633\u0645\u0627\u062d\u0629\u060c \u0639\u0645\u0627\u062f. \u062c\u062f\u0644\u064a\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0631\u0643\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0648\u0639\u064a \u0628\u064a\u0646 \u0623\u0641\u0631\u0627\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0647\u064a\u0626\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645\u064a\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646. \u0628\u064a\u0631\u0648\u062a: \u062f\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0641\u0627\u0631\u0627\u0628\u064a\u060c 2006<\/p>\n

8 Bou Khater, L\u00e9a. The Labor Movement in Lebanon: Power on Hold. Manchester University Press, 2022.<\/p>\n

9 Abi Habib, Roula. \u201cL’action de la Conf\u00e9d\u00e9ration g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des travailleurs libanais (CGTL) de 1975 \u00e0 1992: Port\u00e9e et limites.\u201d Annales de Sociologie et d\u2019Anthropologie, no. 6\u20137 (1997): 77\u2013109.<\/p>\n

10 Bou Khater, L\u00e9a. The Labor Movement in Lebanon: Power on Hold. Manchester University Press, 2022.<\/p>\n

11 Interview with Charbel Nahas.<\/p>\n

12 Interview with Adib Abou Habib.<\/p>\n

13 Bou Khater, L\u00e9a. The Labor Movement in Lebanon: Power on Hold. Manchester University Press, 2022.<\/p>\n

14 Interview with Adib Abou Habib.<\/p>\n

15 Majed, Rima. “A View from the 1990s: Lebanon\u2019s Street Politics in the First Decade After the Civil War (1989\u20132000).” Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2020.<\/p>\n

16 Khalaf, Samir. 2002. Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict. Columbia University Press.<\/p>\n

17 Traboulsi, Fawwaz. 2012. A History of Modern Lebanon. Pluto Press.<\/p>\n

18 Traboulsi, Fawwaz. Identit\u00e9s et solidarit\u00e9s crois\u00e9es dans les conflits du Liban contemporain. PhD diss., Universit\u00e9 de Paris VIII, 1993. Chapter 12, “L’\u00e9conomie politique des milices: le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne mafieux.”<\/p>\n

19 Zbeeb, Mohamad. \u201cLebanon’s Post-War Political Economy: From Reconstruction to Collapse.\u201d In The Lebanon Uprising of 2019: Voices from the Revolution, edited by Jeffrey G. Karam and Rima Majed, Chapter 3. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction Understanding social movements in times of war challenges dominant narratives that often reduce conflict to military confrontations and elite negotiations. While armed actors shape the course of war, civil society remains an active agent, engaging in protest and political mobilization despite instability and violence. Civil movements during conflicts provide critical insights into how populations […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-201","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/201","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=201"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/201\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":218,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/201\/revisions\/218"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=201"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=201"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/socialmovement.lebanesestudies.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=201"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}